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COMMENT
Can You Turn Your Radio On?
The Public Performance Exemption Under
Section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act
Deborah LaGioia'
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary goals of the 1976 Copyright Act' was to ease the tension
between promoting creativity among authors and artists, while promoting the
public policy of making such works available for public consumption.' Congress
attempted to balance these competing demands by granting copyright owners a
set of exclusive protections that promote creativity and authorship, 3 while
providing a set of limited statutory exemptions from copyright liability that
enhance the public's access to such works.4 Consequently, Congress defined the
term "to perform" broadly within these statutory protections.5 Thus, every time a
radio broadcast is received in a private home or a song is sung in the shower, a
copyrighted work is performed.6
Unfortunately, such a broad category of potential infringements would require
immeasurable tactics by licensing groups such as the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) or Broadcast Music, Incorporated
(BMI) to detect and deter illegal uses of copyrighted works, as well as require
impracticable and costly licensing negotiations for small scale, private uses of
such works.7 Thus, Congress required that the performance also be "public" to
* Ms. Deborah LaGioia will receive a J.D. from DePaul University College of Law in 1994.
This article received a first-place award in the 1993 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at DePaul
College of Law.
1. 17 U.S.C. §101-810 (1988).
2. Laura A. Misner, Copyright Liability for Performances of Musical Works: Use of Background
Radio Music in the Aftermath of Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
245 (1986).
3. See 17 U.S.C. §106.
4. See 17 U.S.C. §107-120.
5. 17 U.S.C. §101.
6. Under 17 U.S.C. §110(5), the law applicable to television broadcasts is virtually identical to
that of radio broadcasts.
7. See I GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW & PRACTICE, §5.9, at 693-695 (1989).
ASCAP and BMI hold the rights to license the performance rights of virtually every domestically
copyrighted song. The authors, composers and publishers transfer to ASCAP and/or BMI the right to
1
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find infringement upon the rights of the copyright owner. A copyrighted work is
"publicly performed" if it is broadcast to members of the public capable of
receiving the broadcast.' Obviously, a performance in "a place open to the
public," a place where there are no restrictions on who may enter to see or hear
the performance, constitutes a public performance. 9 However, a performance
limited to family members and their social acquaintances is a non-infringing
private performance exempt under the 1976 Copyright Act.'0
Troublesome, however, is the fact that some establishments, which publicly
perform musical compositions by broadcasting radio transmissions into public
areas, are too small to justify licensing. Although detecting and deterring illegal
performances by a "private performer" singing in a shower is more difficult than
detecting and deterring illegal performances in a local bar and grill, the tactics
ASCAP and BMI would have to employ with the former "private performers"
would be as impractical in the context of the small commercial establishment. It
would cost ASCAP and BMI considerably more to detect and deter illegal uses
by a multitude of small proprietors than it would likely cost those proprietors to
obtain a license from them.
Thus, § 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act exempts from copyright liability
"[s]mall commercial establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto their
premises standard radio ... equipment and turn it on for their customers'
enjoyment."12 Yet, uncertainty surrounds the meaning of §110(5), which
generally requires a proprietor to utilize a single set of stereo equipment of a
kind commonly found in the homes of private consumers in order to publicly
perform a copyrighted work lawfully. 3 Moreover, the proprietor can neither
directly charge the public to hear the radio transmissions sent to his stereo equip-
ment nor further transmit those broadcasts to other places the public may hear
license their copyrighted works; and, as licensor, ASCAP and BMI negotiate a blanket license allow-
ing a licensee, for a specified fee, to publicly perform any work in their repertory an unlimited num-
ber of times for a specified period of time. Id.
8. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1988).
9. Id.
10. Id. Cases illustrative of the problems encountered when determining whether a performance is
public or private in nature include: Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d
154 (3d Cir. 1984) (movies shown in small, private booths located in a public establishment were
held to be public performances, since they occurred in a place open to the public); Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989) (movies
shown in individual hotel rooms were not held to be public performances, because hotels are open to
the public; but a hotel room, once rented, is no longer a place open to the public); On Command
Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (hotel video
viewing system centrally located in the building, allowing only one customer at a time to view the
available movies, was held to be a public performance, because the transmission was received beyond
the place from which it was sent; and it was viewed by members of the public, regardless of the fact
they were in private hotel rooms).
11. 17 U.S.C. §110(5) (1988).
12. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 87 (1976).
13. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1988).
[Vol. IV:49
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them.' 4 Although these factors do not appear troubling at first glance, the courts
are in disagreement over whether the plain meaning of the statute or its legisla-
tive history is the appropriate method for determining the scope and application
of the statute's language, as well as the relevant factors that dictate whether the
statutory requirements are being met.
Some courts follow a textualist approach, which is an interpretation of the
plain meaning of the words in a statutory provision. Textualists believe that the
courts use the legislative history to interpret statutes in a manner inconsistent
with their plain meaning, because the legislative history may reflect unenacted
legislative intentions; and intentions are not law.' s Moreover, there may be so
much legislative history that the court is free to choose which passages to
emphasize or de-emphasize in order to manipulate the law and reach the
conclusion it desires.16 Therefore, textualists limit the courts' use of the legisla-
tive history. A court may use legislative history to discover what Congress meant
by the statute, but it cannot be used as a secondary source of legal rules that
changes the ordinary meaning of the statute. 7
Nevertheless, other courts believe that the legislative history is vital to
statutory interpretation, because "[w]ords often do not, and perhaps cannot, have
a 'plain meaning'."'1 These courts believe that the circumstances influencing a
statute's enactment will change over time; and, because Congress may not have
anticipated some of those circumstances, they will not be embodied in the
statute.' 9 Moreover, Congress may intentionally enact a broad statute and expect
the courts to fill in the missing details on a case by case basis over time, which
14. Id.
15. In the Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989). The Sinclair court followed a
textualist approach to determine that a statute must prevail when a conflict exists between it and its
legislative history. The court maintained that the statute was enacted by both Congress and the Presi-
dent, whereas the legislative history was merely the staff's explanation of that law. The court stated
that such legislative history was "'only admissible to solve doubt [with regard to the statutory lan-
guage] and not to create it' [by allowing the unenacted intent of Congress to be relied on as law] ...
[Congressional intent] is not a source of legal rules competing with those found in the U.S. Code."
Id. at 1344 citing Wisconsin R.R. Commission v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 257 U.S. 563,
589, 42 S. Ct. 232, 238, 66 L. Ed. 371 (1922). Sinclair was cited for this proposition in the most
prominent §110(5) textualist cases: Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp.
1324 (N.D. Ill. 1990), a'd, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992)
(chain store exempt from copyright liability); Edison Brothers Stores, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc.,
760 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Mo. 1991), ajfd, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992). cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1995 (1992) (same).
16. Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1343.
17. Id. at 1344.
18. Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO.
L. REV. 37, 57 (1991). Cases representative of the legislative history approach include: Sailor Music
v. The Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982) (chain store not exempt from copyright liability); Springsteen v. Plaza
Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (miniature golf course exempt from copyright
liability); Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (Mont. 1990) (restaurant not exempt
from copyright liability).
19. Greenberger, supra note 18, at 60.
3
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relieves Congress from having to resolve the infinite amount of issues that could
arise under merely one statutory provision.20 Consequently, if the courts dis-
count Congress' intentions regarding the appropriate scope of the statute, they
effectively substitute their judgment for that of Congress. 2'
This comment analyzes the scope and application of the factors provided in
both § 110(5) and its legislative history. Yet, before evaluating § 110(5) itself,
Section II will briefly overview the pertinent case law under the 1909 Copyright
Act,22 which led to the enactment of the §110(5) exemption under the 1976
Copyright Act.23 Section III will then analyze each' of §110(5)'s various
components according to both a textualist and a legislative history approach.
Although establishing guidelines as to the appropriate parameters of the
individual requirements is difficult at best, Section IV will argue that the desired
approach is to rely on the plain meaning of § 110(5) to extrapolate the appropri-
ate factors of analysis, while eliminating any wholly independent elements of
analysis provided in the legislative history. If the courts rely on the textualist
approach, they will likely define the statute consistently with its plain meaning,
which has not occurred with the poorly defined elements provided in the
legislative history.
I. CASE LAW UNDER THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act,24 the established precedent
defining the scope of a "performance" was Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.25
In Jewell-LaSalle, the defendant wired a radio receiving set to each of the hotel's
public and private rooms, which allowed the radio broadcasts to be heard
throughout the hotel.26 A "performance" question was certified to the Supreme
Court, and it held that the defendant's conduct constituted a performance under
the 1909 Copyright Act.27 The Court reasoned that radio waves alone are not
audible but require a receiver to reproduce them into sound waves audible to the
listener.2" The Court maintained that, rather than hearing the original program,
the listener was hearing a reproduction of that program, which it considered a
second, simultaneous performance with that of the broadcasting station.29 Thus,
20. Id. at 62.
21. Id. at 70.
22. 1909 Copyright Act, 35 stat. 1075 (1976).
23. 17 U.S.C. §110(5) (1988).
24. 17 U.S.C. §101-810.
25. 283 U.S. 191 (1931). See also, Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. v.
New York Hotel Statler Co., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (Since a hotel is a place of
public accommodation, "reproduction by the hotel's master receiving sets of the electric impulses of
the broadcast, and their distribution among its rooms ... is a public performance... of the broad-
cast program.").
26. Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 195.
27. Id. at 202.
28. Id. at 200-201.
29. Id. But see, e.g., Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366, 367 (W.D. Mo. 1929) (one operating a radio
is not performing by merely receiving inaudible radio waves and translating them into audible sound
[Vol. IV:49
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the Court assumed that any business desiring to legally rebroadcast radio
programs for its customers required a license from the copyright owner in order
to avoid liability."
The Supreme Court displaced the Jewell-LaSalle "performance" doctrine over
thirty-five years later when it held that no "performance" took place in two cable
television (CATV) cases.3' In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc.,32 the plaintiff operated a cable television system which enhanced the tele-
vision signals received from television stations and rechanneled them to CATV
subscribers.3 3 The Court found the Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. decision
questionable and created a functional test under which "[b]roadcasters perform
[and v]iewers do not perform," because broadcasters were active performers and
the viewers passive beneficiaries of that performance.' The Court reasoned that
CATV fell on the viewer's side of the line, because it merely carried "[w]ithout
editing, whatever programs [it] receive[d, while b]roadcasters procure[d the]
programs and propagate[d] them to the public."35
The Court reached the same result six years later in Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,a6 which involved allegations similar to
those in Fortnightly. Applying Fortnightly's functional test, the Court held that
the relay of distant television signals to viewers normally unable to receive such
signals without the help of CATV still did not transform CATV's status into that
of a broadcaster.3 7 CATV was, once again, merely receiving and carrying,
without editing, the programs that broadcaster's had acquired and dispersed to
the public; and the court found irrelevant the distant origin of such television
signals.3"
The Supreme Court finally reached the seminal "performance" case, Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (hereinafter Aiken),39 forty-three years after
waves); Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929) ("The performance in such cases takes
place in the studio of the broadcasting station.").
Yet, in dictum, the Court in Jewell-LaSalle noted a difference between licensed and unlicensed
broadcasts by radio stations. This distinction was first noted in Debaum, which explained that when a
copyright owner licenses a station to perform a radio broadcast of his composition he consents to any
reception of that performance by others. The radio station in Jewell-LaSalle, however, was not li-
censed; but the Court implied that, if it had been, the hotel's conduct may have been impliedly con-
sented to by the copyright owner. Later cases largely ignored this distinction. Jewell-LaSalle, 283
U.S. at 199, n. 5.
30. Id. at 200-201.
31. Fortnightly Corp. V. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Teleprompter Corp.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
32. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
33. Id. at 392.
34. Id. at 398-399.
35. Id. at 400.
36. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
37. Id. at 410.
38. Id.
39. 356 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 151
(1975).
1993]
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deciding Buck v. Jewell LaSalle Realty Co. Although the Court decided this case
under the 1909 Copyright Act,' it formed the basis, as well as the boundaries,
of § 110(5) under the 1976 Copyright Act.41 The central issue was whether a
performance had occurred when the defendant installed a radio and four ceiling
mounted speakers in his fast food establishment and, without a license from
ASCAP or BMI, tuned in radio broadcasts for his employees' and customers'
enjoyment.' The Court held that no "performance" had taken place even
though the decision in Jewell-LaSalle was directly on point. 3 It maintained that
the later cable television cases had impliedly overruled Jewell-LaSalle in favor of
the functional test created in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artist Television, Inc.
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc." Thus, the
Court strictly limited Jewell-LaSalle to its facts, without expressly overruling it,
and maintained that Aiken's conduct fell on the viewer's side of the line because
it was a passive beneficiary of the programs procured by the broadcasters.4
Thus, no "performance" had taken place.46
III. CASE LAW UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
Section 110(5) exempts from copyright liability "[s]mall commercial
establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto their premises standard
radio... equipment and turn it on for their customers' enjoyment., 47 Congress
restricted this provision by stating that the factual situation present in Aiken (four
ordinary ceiling mounted speakers in close proximity to the receiving set)
represented "the outer limit" of the exemption.48 Section 110 provides:
[Tihe following are not infringements of copyright...
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or
display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes,
unless-
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the
public.49
40. 1909 Copyright Act, 35 stat. 1075 (1976).
41. 17 U.S.C. §110(5) (1988).
42. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, at 152.
43. Id. at 160-161.
44. Id. at 161. See also, David E. Shipley, Copyright Law and Your Neighborhood Bar and Grill:
Recent Developments in Performance Rights and the Section 110(5) Exemption, 29 ARiz. L. REV.
475, 483 (1987).
45. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 161-162.
46. Id.
47. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976).
48. Id.
49. 17 U.S.C. §110(5) (1988). Section 1 10(5)(A)'s requirement that no direct charge be made to
see or hear the performance has not proved to be problematic. The parties usually stipulate that no
direct charge was made by the defendant which would disqualify him from claiming exemption under
the statute. Under this provision, there is no prohibition against indirect charges such as club mem-
bership fees or minimum food charges in restaurants. However, a cover charge for admission into an
[Vol. IV:49
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Despite these statutory precepts, the legislative history also calls for the
evaluation of an additional factor: Exemption should be denied if an establish-
ment is of sufficient size to justify obtaining a background music service
license.50 Since the courts are split as to whether the statutorily mandated
requirements alone are to be utilized in their evaluation of §110(5) or whether
the factors provided in the legislative history are to be added to this analysis, the
following discussion encompasses the criteria provided in both the statute and its
legislative history.
A. Single Receiving Apparatus of a Kind Commonly Used in Private Homes
In order to be exempt from liability, § 110(5) requires that an establishment
use a "single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes."'"
To help determine whether a home-type system is being used on the premises,
Congress provided several factors in the legislative history for the courts to
evaluate when deciding whether or not to exempt a particular establishment.
These factors include:
[The] size, physical arrangement, and noise level of the areas within the
establishment where the transmissions are made audible .... and the extent to
which the receiving apparatus is altered or augmented for the purpose of
improving the aural ... quality of the performance for individual members of
the public using those areas.52
1. The Legislative Approach
Since the statute itself provides no explicit boundaries for defining what
constitutes a home-type apparatus, the courts following the legislative history
establishment may constitute a direct charge eliminating defendant's qualification for exemption. See
Susan A. Maslow, "Watts" The Perimeter for the Doctrine of the Communication of Radio Broadcast
Under Section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act?, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 1056, 1076 (1982); 2 NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §8.18[C], at 8-202 (1990). But see 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, §5.8.1.5, at
631 ("'[A] direct charge' would presumably include cover and minimum charges [for food] as well
as more direct admission fees.").
This requirement should not be confused with the "for profit" principle, which §110(5) does
not deal with. Under the 1909 Act, an unauthorized performance would infringe only if it was for
profit. However, this requirement was limited under the 1976 Copyright Act, because it became diffi-
cult to distinguish between "for profit" and "not for profit" performances. This was due to the fact
that many "not for profit" enterprises were capable of paying for performance licenses. However, sec-
tions 110(l)-(4) "[d]eal with performances ... now generally exempt under the 'for profit' limitation
or other provisions of the copyright law... " H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 81
(1976). See 2 NIMMER, §8.15[A], at 8-174.2; Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917); LaSalle
Music Publishers, Inc. v. Highfill, 622 F. Supp. 168, 169 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Almo Music Corp. v. 77
East Adams, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
50. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976).
51. 17 U.S.C. §110(5) (1988).
52. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976) (liability is also imposed under the
legislative history when a proprietor has a commercial sound system installed or converts a home-
type receiving apparatus into one analogous to a commercial sound system).
1993]
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approach have relied heavily on the above legislative factors when determining
the scope and depth of Aiken's outer limit. The court in Sailor Music v. The Gap
Stores, Inc., 3 for example, examined the "size" of defendant's establishment.
The average size of all 420 stores was 3500 square feet of publicly accessible
space; and the radio receivers in two stores were connected, via hidden wiring, to
four or seven speakers recessed behind ceiling grids.' These speakers were
arranged in a manner which allowed the music to be heard throughout the
establishments.55 The court held that Congress did not intend to exempt stores
such as The Gap, because its average square footage greatly exceeded the outer
limit of Aiken's store, which was 620 square feet.56 Moreover, the court
maintained that the equipment may have been converted into a commercial
system because it contained built in wiring and four or seven speakers recessed
behind ceiling grids.57 Thus, the square footage, combined with what the court
considered an elaborate sound system, compelled the court to place The Gap
beyond the scope of §110(5), and exemption was denied.5" The appellate court
affirmed,5 9 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 60
Since the music was audible throughout the store, and the system contained
no public address system, the factors evaluating the noise levels in the
transmission areas and the augmentation of the system did not need
consideration. The "size" determination was relevant to the court's evaluation;
yet, the court still failed to examine the physical arrangement of the equipment,
although it, too, was relevant to the determination. "Size" is only one of the
factors to be examined; and, if a court insists on following the legislative history
approach rather than a textualist approach, all of the factors should be considered
before a final determination is made.6' This will deter a court, at least some-
what, from picking particular factors and emphasizing certain judicially-created
definitions of those factors. Moreover, a factor evaluated later in the analysis
could provide a stronger basis for denying exemption than the first one
examined; and future courts may find such an analysis useful, if not
determinative, in their analyses, should a legislative history approach be adopted
or mandated in their circuit.
The "size" or square footage of Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc. was
53. 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
945 (1982).
54. The Gap Stores, 516 F. Supp. at 923-924.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 925. Neither the Aiken case nor the legislative history explicitly mention the square
footage of Aiken's establishment, but almost all the cases relying on the legislative factors apply that
square footage when comparing the size of the establishments.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The Gap Stores, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981).
60. The Gap Stores, 456 U.S. 945 (1982).
61. See Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 (N.D.N.C. 1985) (not-
ing that all of the factors in the legislative history should be considered when evaluating § 110(5)).
[Vol. IV:49
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compared to the defendant's stores in Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co.,
62
which had public areas in excess of 10,000 square feet.63 The court declared
that the equipment used was not of a type commonly found in private homes,
since the defendant had used a radio receiver, separate amplifiers and three to
eight mounted speakers both inside and outside of the stores.6 Moreover, most
of the speakers were located 150 feet from the receiver, and the system also
contained a public address system.65 Even though the defendant argued that the
primary purpose for using the music was to muffle nearby industrial noise for
the benefit of its employees and to attract the public to its stores, the court
declared that the purpose for which music was used was irrelevant to the
question of infringement.'
Even though the "size" of the establishment (10,000 square feet), the physical
arrangement of the equipment (receiver 150 feet from the speakers) and
augmentation of the system (integration of a public address system) would have
justified denying exemption for exceeding Aiken's outer limit, an application of
all the legislative history factors should still have been required.67 Instead of
manipulating the legislative history to reach the result they desired, the court, at
a minimum, should have explained why it felt that an examination of the noise
levels in the transmission areas was not applicable to its determination. By pur-
chasing their goods, customers are the proprietors' livelihood. Thus, the noise
level may have been the primary reason for the installation of the equipment,
since customers find shopping in a pleasant atmosphere much more enjoyable
than hearing industrial equipment pounding in the background.
In Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews," defendants owned a restaurant with a
public area of 1,192 square feet.69 They attached five recessed ceiling speakers,
via hidden wiring, to a used radio receiver located between thirty and forty-five
feet from the speakers.7 ° The system was professionally installed and was
originally intended to operate a public address system. 7' Yet, at that time, the
62. 617 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
63. Id. at 1023.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1022.
67. Id. at 1023. See also Crabshaw Music v. K-Bob's of El Paso, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 763 (W.D.
Tex. 1990) (finding a public address system integrated into stereo system containing eleven speakers
dispersed throughout the public areas of the establishment a commercial system designed for dissem-
ination of sound in a commercial building); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Jeep Sales & Service Co., 747
F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Va. 1990). In Jeep Sales the court denied relief after noting that defendant uti-
lized at least four ceiling recessed speakers in the establishment and four public address speakers
mounted on light poles outside the establishment. The court stated that the Aiken outer limit "has
been strictly construed[, and that] courts have been unwilling to apply the exemption where the phys-
ical size of the public space in which communication... occurred is larger than that in Aiken or
where the receiver used had features and power typical of a commercial receiver." Id. at 1193.
68. 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
69. Id. at 1034.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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system was only used to broadcast radio transmissions, and it was not optimal
for playing background music for its customers.72 The court reasoned that
recessed ceiling speakers in combination with a substantial length of hidden
wiring did not constitute a home-type system.7 3 Furthermore, the court main-
tained that the physical arrangement exceeded the Aiken outer limit, because the
speakers were dispersed greater distances than the four speakers in close
proximity to the receiving set in Aiken's shop.74 With regard to the system it-
self, the court stated that the entire system and the context of its use must be
evaluated, because, even though "individual components of a system may be
commonly used in homes, the whole apparatus once installed may not qualify as
a 'home-type' system."'75 The court noted that defendant's system did in fact
contain some components commonly found in private homes but found the
overall system to be commercial in nature.76
The Hickory Grove court did not examine the square footage or "size" of
defendant's establishment under the home-type apparatus factor, but rather
evaluated it under the small commercial establishment factor along with the
revenues and seating capacity of the establishment.77 It did, however, find
determinative to its result the physical arrangement of the system. Yet, it was un-
clear whether the court took into account that the system was originally installed
to maintain a public address system and may have been the type of augmentation
that Congress intended to be examined. Alteration and/or augmentation of the
system was a factor explicitly listed in the legislative history for the courts to
examine;7' and the court should have noted that it could have applied this factor
as well. Nevertheless, the court glossed over this factor and focused on the
factors it believed determinative to its evaluation.
Aside from determining that the system as a whole was commercial in nature,
the court should have also taken into account the poor audibility of the system in
connection with the noise levels in the transmission areas. Since the system was
not optimal for playing background music, it may have somewhat tipped the
balance in favor of finding a home-type rather than a commercial system.79 Yet,
in light of all the factors available, the poor audibility still may not have been
enough to exempt defendant from liability, since the overall system was
commercial in nature.80
72. Id.
73. id. at 1038.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. See Section III(B) and accompanying text.
78. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976).
79. See, e.g., Springsteen, 602 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D.N.C. 1985) (finding defendant exempt due to
poor audibility/sophistication of stereo speakers).
80. See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982) (relying on
the legislative history, the court denied defendant exemption from liability, because each store had a
commercial monaural system, with widely separated speakers of a type not commonly used in private
homes); Lamminations Music v. P&X Markets, Inc., No. C 84 6840 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (finding the
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It should now be apparent that almost every case examined under the
legislative history approach has denied § 110(5) exemption to the establishment's
owner. The only case where the court employed the legislative history approach
to grant the proprietor exemption from liability is Springsteen v. Plaza Roller
Dome, Inc.81 Unlike Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., the court in Spring-
steen found determinative the poor audibility of the transmissions in the public
areas.82 Defendant's system incorporated a radio receiver wired to six speakers
mounted on light poles over a 7,500-square-foot miniature golf course.83
However, the speakers were very unsophisticated and could be heard without
distortion only at close ranges.'
The court noted that defendant's establishment clearly exceeded that of Aiken
in square footage; however, it maintained that "the size of the allegedly
offending facility and the number of speakers are not, however, standing alone,
the sole or even predominate factors to consider in determining the applicability
of the exemption." 5 Instead, the court asserted that all of the factors provided
in the legislative history should be considered in determining whether a receiving
apparatus has been converted into a commercial system beyond the scope of
§110(5).6 The court then declared that defendant's sound system was obviously
of poorer sound quality than the systems in Aiken and Sailor Music v. The Gap
Stores, Inc., where the music could be heard clearly throughout the stores.87
Therefore, the court held that this was not a commercial sound system, and
system was not home-type because it utilized receiving equipment and six to ten ceiling mounted
speakers "akin to a commercial background music system," and the speakers were "not arranged
within a narrow circumference from the receiver"); Merrill v. County Stores, 669 F. Supp. 1164 (D.
N.H. 1987) (13,000 square feet establishment with fourteen to fifteen recessed ceiling speakers was
twenty-one times larger than the 620 square foot, four speaker shop in Aiken; and augmenting the
system by giving it paging capabilities, as well as integrating it into the phone system, definitively
placed it outside the scope of the type of equipment commonly found in private homes); Merrill v.
Bill Millers Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (finding that "[a]ll
the features of the complete apparatus must be considered in determining whether it is 'home-type'
and defendant's use of a homestyle Pioneer receiver, two eight-inch J.W. Davis speakers installed
behind grids mounted in the ceiling and located approximately 40 feet from the receiving set consti-
tuted a commercial system); Gnossos Music v. DiPompo, No 89-0051 P, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15988 at *1 (D. Me. 1989) (reasoning that the commercial-power recessed ceiling speakers, con-
cealed wiring and breadth of coverage, in combination with the receiver, created a commercial sound
system, which was not exempt from liability); U.S. Songs, Inc. v. Downside Lenox, Inc., 771 F.
Supp. 1220 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (relying on Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, International Korwin
Corp. v. Kowalczyk, Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Inc. and Gnossos Music v.
DiPompo to deny exemption because the courts there examined receiving apparatuses virtually identi-
cal to defendants' and found them to be of a kind not commonly used in private homes).
81. Springsteen, 602 F. Supp. 1113.
82. Id. at 1118.
83. Id. at 1114.
84. Id. at 1118.
85. Id. at 1117-1118.
86. Id. at 1118.
87. Id. 11
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defendant was exempt from copyright liability.88
Notwithstanding the court's assertion that all of the factors were determinative
to the analysis, the court emphasized a single factor, namely the quality/audibility
of the components utilized, in order to exempt the defendant's establishment
from liability. Although the court noted the applicability of the other factors, it
failed to discuss what bearing the size of the establishment and the physical
arrangement of the equipment would have had in the balancing process. If these
other factors were considered in combination, and pitted against the inferior
quality of the equipment used throughout the 7,500-square-foot establishment,
they may have outweighed a finding of exemption. The square footage of the
establishment and the physical arrangement of the equipment clearly exceeded
the Aiken outer limit regardless of the sound quality of the system itself.
As the above analysis exemplifies, the random and discretionary emphasis and
de-emphasis of the factors provided in the legislative history is one of the
primary evils of the legislative history approach. Relying on this approach
requires the courts to make case-by-case factual evaluations of a problematic list
of factors, and the courts have been inconsistent when choosing and defining the
particular factors that are determinative to finding copyright liability. For
example, the court in Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc. examined the size of
the establishment; but it failed to evaluate the physical arrangement of the
equipment, which may have exceeded the set-up allowed under the Aiken outer
limit. However, the court in Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co. did analyze the
physical arrangement of the equipment, along with the establishment's size and
the augmentation of the system; but it failed to examine the noise levels in the
transmission areas, although defendant claimed the music was to muffle nearby
industrial noise. These inconsistencies force the courts to make subjective and
arbitrary decisions regarding exemption. More importantly, proprietors of public
establishments who wish to tune in radio broadcasts are forced to do so under
conditions of uncertainty with regard to potential copyright liability. 89
2. The Textualist Approach
Due to the problems emanating from the legislative history approach, other
courts believe that the legislative factors may be used only to help interpret
vague statutory text but not to supply additional elements to the statute itself.90
To textualists, the use of the legislative history thwarts the statute's plain
meaning and delves into Congressional intentions, which are not enacted law.91
The prominent textualist cases are Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's
Boutiques, Inc.92 and Edison Brothers Stores, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc.93
88. Id.
89. Misner, supra note 2, at 250.
90. In the Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989).
91. Id. at 1343. See also International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. I11.
1987) (examining the plain meaning of the statutory language and later noting that the legislative
history supported the conclusions).
92. 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affid, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
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In Claire's, the average size of the two types of stores owned by the company
were 861 square feet and 2022 square feet.94 The equipment in each store
included a 5-watt Radio Shack receiver with two speaker connections, an indoor
antenna, speaker wire and two Radio Shack speakers attached to the ceiling
behind grids.95 One speaker was an average distance of five to fifteen feet from
the receiver, and the other one was twenty to thirty-five feet from the
receiver."
The court initially analyzed the chain store-by-store and noted that each store
used only a single receiving apparatus. 97 It then went on to analyze the entire
stereo system and concluded that the factors to be evaluated included: whether
the equipment is generally sold for commercial or private use; the number of
speakers the receiver can accommodate; the number of speakers actually used;
the manner in which the speakers are installed; whether concealed wiring is
utilized; the distance of the speakers from the receiver; and whether the receiver
is integrated with a public announcement system or telephone lines.9 The court
Ct. 1942 (1992).
93. 760 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1995 (1992).
94. Claire's. 754 F. Supp. at 1325 (Claire's owns and operates both Claire's Boutiques and
Arcadia, which range from 458 square feet to 2000 square feet and 748 square feet to 3300 square
feet, respectively).
95. Id. at 1325-1326.
96. Id. at 1326.
97. Id. at 1335. The district court also examined the defendant's chain as a whole; and, although
the court followed a textualist approach, it looked to the legislative history, because the statute did
not provide a definitive answer with regard to the proper analysis of a chain of stores. The court
noted that this was appropriate, because no additional element was being added to the statute itself.
The court then stated that the legislature intended to examine individual stores, otherwise the Aiken
exemption would be thwarted, because no chain store would utilize a single receiving apparatus. It
reasoned that since Aiken's establishment was the outer limit of the exemption and was also a chain,
the individual stores must be evaluated in order to reaffirm the Aiken decision that the legislative
history relied on. lt Accord Edison Brothers, 760 F. Supp. at 770.
The district court's decision was essentially affirmed by the appellate court. However, the ap-
pellate court stated that the legislative history used the word "proprietor", which indicated that Con-
gress had considered establishments with only a single location. Although Congress did not address
whether all the receivers of a corporation are to be accounted for or only those in a particular loca-
tion, the appellate court indicated that "anyone" could benefit from the § 110(5) exemption, because
the statute never stated what types of individuals or groups were entitled to utilize the exemption.
Expanding upon the fact that "anyone" could benefit from the use of the statute, the appellate court
maintained that the "legal fiction of corporate personhood was developed precisely for this type of
case." Thus, even though the corporation was a potential infringer, the court maintained "the proper
analysis should be limited to the area where a single work is performed," because the statute does not
require counting how many receiving apparatuses were utilized to receive a numerous variety of
works. Unless Claire's, as a corporate whole, acted as a broadcaster by initiating broadcasts from a
central location or by requiring a certain station to be tuned in, all the receivers utilized by the corpo-
ration need not be counted together. Congress merely "wanted to foreclose the unlicensed playing of
more than one receiver at a single geographic site." Accordingly, the analysis was appropriately limit-
ed to the individual stores rather than the chain as a whole, as the district court had held in the first
place. Claire's, 949 F.2d 1482.
98. Claire's, 754 F. Supp. at 1329. 13
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maintained that all of the factors weighed in Claire's favor with the exception of
the use of concealed wiring and ceiling-mounted speakers. However, it
reasoned that two negative factors were not sufficient to deny defendant
exemption from liability, because no one factor is determinative in the
analysis.0 ° Instead, the entire system must be weighed; and, after doing so, the
court held that the sound system was of a type commonly found in private
homes. 0 1 The appellate court affirmed,"°' and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. '3
The court's analysis did not encompass a "size" determination, as the
legislative history approach dictates, because such a determination is irrelevant to
the type of equipment implemented and whether such equipment is commonly
found in a private home. Under the court's approach, it also appeared that the
list of factors emerged easily from the statutory language, since they focused on
what type of system an average consumer would own versus what components a
commercially installed system, likely unaffordable to a private consumer, would
include. Furthermore, the court commented on every factor on its list, something
those following the legislative history approach have failed to do by picking and
choosing the factors and their definitions in order to reach the result desired. The
factors are also self-defining, unlike the broadly stated ones found in the
legislative history. For example, when attempting to determine whether the Aiken
outer limit has been surpassed, it is much easier to apply and define "the
distance of the speakers from receiver"'" rather than "the physical arrangement
of the equipment in the establishment."'0 5
The approach taken in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc. was
followed by the court in Edison Brothers Stores, Inc. v. Broadcast Music,
Inc.1°6 The plaintiff had enacted a store Radio Policy requiring simple receiv-
ers, the use of only two portable box speakers within fifteen feet of the receiver,
and permitting only radio broadcasts to be played in the stores."° Thus, the
plaintiff attempted to approximate, as closely as possible, the physical arrange-
ment and quality of equipment found in Aiken's establishment.'0 8
As in Claire's, the court dismissed defendant's argument that the chain must
be examined as a whole.' °9 It then noted that the system as a whole consisted
of components sold for private consumer use, and strict enforcement of the
Radio Policy would ensure that no abuses would occur."' Moreover, the court
99. Id. at 1331.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Claire's, 949 F.2d 1482.
103. Claire's, 112 S. Ct. 1942.
104. Claire's, 754 F. Supp. at 1329.
105. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976).
106. 760 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
107. Id. at 769-770.
108. Id. at 771.
109. Id. at 770.
110. Id. at 771.
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maintained that the physical arrangement duplicated the placement found in a
common household, since the speakers were not ceiling mounted and the wiring
was exposed to view. The Court also maintained that placing the speakers no
more than fifteen feet from the receiver was within the range of any "modest
homestyle setup."'' Thus, the court concluded that Edison Brothers was trying
to "focus on the simplicity, and the spirit of the exception when it was first
promulgated in 1976."112 As in Claire's, the appellate court affirmed,"' and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari."
4
Thus, the Edison Brothers set-up was as simplistic as Aiken's and met the
requirements provided in Claire's: a home type receiver, which likely only
accommodated two speakers; the use of only two speakers which were not
mounted, did not use concealed wiring, and were kept at a modest distance from
the receiver; and prohibiting the system's integration with other types of systems.
As in Claire's, the court's analysis, once again, did not encompass an irrelevant
"size" determination.
B. Of Sufficient Size to Justify Licensing
The background music service test considers the establishment's "size," and it
states "[t]hat a small commercial establishment.., which merely augmented a
home type receiver and which was not of sufficient size to justify, as a practical
matter, a subscription to a commercial background music service, would be
exempt."'" 5 Section 110(5) does not require the courts to apply this test; this
factor originates entirely from the legislative history surrounding the statute.
Nevertheless, the courts following the legislative history approach rely heavily on
this factor, while textualist courts refuse to examine this factor, because it is
neither an element listed in the statute nor an aid to interpreting those elements.
This "factor" merely represents a legislative determination that the size of the
Aiken establishment did not justify subscription to a background music service;
but, beyond this, the elements a court is permitted to use in applying this "test"
are left unresolved." 6 Moreover, the courts have split on whether "size" refers
to the physical size or the financial size, or both, of the establishment
involved.1
7
111. Id.
112. Ld.
113. Edison Brothers, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992).
114. Edison Brothers, 112 S. Ct. 1995 (1992).
115. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976).
116. 2 NIMMER, supra note 49, §8.18[C], at 8-216.
117. Id. However, if the small commercial establishment requirement is an outgrowth of the factors
used to determine the home-type receiving apparatus, it could be argued that the small commercial
establishment criteria is an interpretive aid to that determination. Yet, the small commercial establish-
ment requirement would have to be limited to an examination of the physical size of the establish-
ment rather than the size of the establishment's revenues, because the home type receiving apparatus
only examines the former of the two. This would be useful, because it will define what Congress
meant by "size", as well as limit the determination the court must make in deciding whether an estab-
lishment is of sufficient size to justify licensing.
1993]
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Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc."' was one of the first cases to exam-
ine this "factor," and the court denied exemption to The Gap, a 420-store chain
with revenues of nearly $300 million and an average size of 3,500 square
feet." 9 Without explanation as to whether it was relying on The Gap's 3,500
square feet, its $300 million in revenues or both, the Court decided that The Gap
was of sufficient size to justify licensing. 20
Although the court in Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc. never specified
whether it was examining the physical or financial size of the establishment,
Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co.12 1 compared only the physical sizes of the
establishments. It maintained that defendant's establishment greatly exceeded, at
10,000 square feet, both the outer limit of the Aiken exemption, which called for
no more than 620 square feet open to the public, and the 3,500 square feet of the
Gap stores, which was found of sufficient size to justify licensing.' 2 Thus, the
court found defendant's stores of sufficient size to justify subscription to a
background music service as well.' 3
Nevertheless, the court in Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc." took the
opposite course of analysis and examined the revenues generated by defendant's
establishment. Defendant's miniature golf course consisted of 7,500 square feet
and rarely generated over $1,000 per month during the six months of the year it
was open to the public." Although the court noted that the defendant's
establishment was twelve times larger than the one in Aiken, it maintained that
its revenues were insufficient to justify obtaining a background music
license. 26 The court compared defendant's establishment to the establishments
in Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc.,' 27 with its 420 stores and $300 million
in yearly revenues, and Aiken,128 which was a chain operating year round and
assumed by the court to be generating substantial revenues. It asserted that if any
operation was not of sufficient size to justify licensing it was defendant's $1,000
118. 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
945 (1982).
119. The Gap Stores, 516 F. Supp. at 923-924.
120. Id. at 925. See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., Inc., 678 F.2d 816, 817 (9th
Cir. 1982) ("[The size and nature of the operation justifies the use of a commercial background mu-
sic system.") (emphasis added); Lamminations Music v. P&X Markets, Inc., No. C 84 6840 (N.D.
Cal. 1985) (same); Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (W.D.
Tex. 1988) ("It is clearly 'practical' for a chain of restaurants, each restaurant having 1000 to 1500
square feet of public dining area and grossing well over $500,000 annually, to subscribe to a com-
mercial background music service."). But see, e.g., International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F.
Supp. 652 (N.D. Il1. 1987) (finding both physical and financial issue to justify the subscription to a
background music service).
121. 617 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
122. Id. at 1023.
123. Id
124. 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
125. Id. at 1117, 1119.
126. Id. at 1118-1119.
127. The Gap Stores, 516 F. Supp. 923.
128. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
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per month operation.129 Thus, the golf course was exempt from liability."' a
Unlike previous cases relying on the legislative history approach, the court in
Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews13' not only took into account the physical
and financial size of the establishment, but added the seating capacity of the
business to the analysis. Defendant's establishment contained 1,192 square feet
of public area and a seating capacity of 120 persons. 32 Since the revenues of
the establishment were never disclosed by defendant, the court relied on the fact
that 1,192 square feet greatly exceeded the 620 square feet Aiken outer limit. 33
On that basis alone, the court found that this was not a small commercial
establishment, but it went on to hold that "[o]ther courts have refused to find that
restaurants with comparable seating capacities qualify as 'small commercial
establishments'. '' "M Thus, defendant's establishment was of sufficient size to
justify subscribing to a background music service.35
In light of the cases discussed, an establishment may be exempt if it stays
under approximately 620 square feet (Aiken),136 but if it reaches 2,769 or more
square feet (Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc.)37 it may fall outside of the
§ 110(5) exemption and require licensing. 38 Yet, this is applicable only if the
court is defining "size" in its physical sense. No attempt was even made by the
courts relying on the financial size of an establishment to determine the
appropriate financial boundaries that would justify a subscription to a background
music service. These courts merely noted the financial size of the establishment
and guessed as to whether or not they believed that this particular establishment
could afford a background music subscription. Thus, with regard to the cases
discussed, if a defendant's profits are less than that of Springsteen v. Plaza
Roller Dome, Inc. (approximately $1,000 per month for six months),3 9 but at
least not greater than that of Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc. (at least $300
million per year),'" the defendant may be found exempt.
In sum, the only thing that has been accomplished by applying the back-
ground music service test, which is not enacted law, is a failure to focus on the
plain meaning of the statute. The courts appear unsure of the meaning of "size,"
129. Springsteen, 602 F. Supp. at 1118-1119.
130. Id. at 1119. See also Merrill v. The County Stores, 669 F. Supp. 1164, at 1170 (D. N.H.
1987) (holding that "[d]efendant's $2.5 million in annual retail sales justified subscription to a com-
mercial background music system.").
131. 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
132. Id. at 1034.
133. Id. at 1039.
134. Id.
135. See also Gnossos Music v. DiPompo, No. 89-0051 P, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS *1, at *13 (D.
Me. 1989) (with 1,824 square feet of space open to the public and two dining rooms seating 172
people, a lobby, lounge and banquet room, defendant's is a far more sophisticated operation than
Aiken's and is of sufficient size to justify licensing).
136. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151.
137. The Gap Stores, 516 F. Supp. 923.
138. Maslow, supra note 49, at 1092.
139. Springsteen, 602 F. Supp. 1113.
140. The Gap Stores, 516 F. Supp. 923.
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and the addition of this element to § 110(5) forces the courts to make arbitrary
and unpredictable case-by-case determinations of what is "of sufficient size to
justify licensing." If the courts cannot define "size" or identify with more
precision the commonalities among cases, such explorations into the legislative
history are unwarranted.
C. Further Transmission to the Public
The last component of §110(5) requires that a "transmission thus received...
[not be] further transmitted to the public."'41 Under the 1976 Copyright Act, to
"transmit" a performance is "to communicate it by any device or process
whereby... sounds are received beyond the place from which they are
sent."' 42 Consequently, Congress provided no definition as to what constituted
a "further transmission," and the legislative history surrounding this concept is
sparse. It appears, however, that Congress denies exemption to performances
further transmitted "beyond the place where the receiving apparatus is located,
and this may encompass performances by public establishments whereby radio
transmissions are sent to various places or rooms within the establishment."' 143
1. The Legislative History Approach
The "further transmission" limitation has proved difficult to apply, since the
legislative history courts examine the equipment carrying the transmission, 44
while the textualist courts examine the transmission itself. 45 Moreover, very
few of the cases following the legislative history approach even applied the
"further transmission" factor.146 Eliminating an entire statutory factor lends
credence to the argument that the legislative history approach fails to focus on
the language of the statute, which is enacted law. Accordingly, it gives the courts
free reign to define and apply the factors that weigh in favor of the result they
desire.
For example, Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc. 47 was one of the few
141. 17 U.S.C. §110(5)(B) (1988).
142. 17 U.S.C. §101.
143. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976). See also Maslow, supra note 49, at
1079-80.
144. See, e.g., Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, at 1038 (D. Mont. 1990)
(receiver located in room separate from speakers constituted a further transmission).
145. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, at 1332 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (further transmission encompasses a rebroadcast or use of multiple speakers rather than the
location of the receiver and speakers).
146. Cases failing to examine the "further transmit" factor of §110(5) include: Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982); Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F.
Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Lamminations Music v. P&X Markets, Inc., No. C 84 6840 (N.D. Cal.
1985); Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Merrill v. The
County Stores, 669 F. Supp. 1164 (D. N.H. 1987); Crabshaw Music v. K-Bob's of El Paso, Inc., 744
F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Jeep Sales & Service Co., 747 F. Supp.
1190 (E.D. Va. 1990).
147. 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
[Vol. IV:49
18
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol4/iss1/4
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE EXEMPTION
legislative history cases to apply this statutory factor. The court, without
discussion, concluded that The Gap had further transmitted the radio broadcasts,
because the broadcasts were received on the radio receiver and transmitted from
there to the recessed ceiling speakers and played for the public. 48
This argument assumed, however, that a further transmission occurred because
the broadcast traveled over the speaker wires.' 49 Yet, this result goes against
the legislative history's "outer limit." If the court's analysis is considered viable,
the entire Aiken exemption is eliminated from the legislative history, since the
broadcasts received in Aiken's establishment were also sent to his speakers over
speaker wire.
The court in Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews,150 however, examined the
distance of the speakers from the receiver. It stated that the courts have
interpreted this factor under §110(5) to mean "any dispersal of sound from a
point of reception through a[n] ... establishment."''  Since the receiver was
located in the lobby and the speakers in the dining room, the court reasoned that
defendants had further transmitted the radio broadcasts by merely placing the
speakers apart from the receiver.'52 It appears, therefore, that had the receiver
been in the dining room with the speakers, it would have satisfied the last re-
quirement for exemption. Nonetheless, even in this instance the defendants would
not have been exempt under Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc., since a further
transmission occurred when the broadcast was carried over the speaker wires.
Therefore, the Hickory Grove court appeared to maintain that, by placing a
"wall" between the receiver and the speakers, a broadcast was converted into a
"further transmission." However, this analysis seems to encompass the dispersal
of a primary transmission, and this is inappropriate. The location of the receiver
and the speakers is irrelevant; it is the same transmission received by the radio
receiver and made audible by the speakers, not a reproduction or secondary
transmission further transmitted to the public. 53
2. The Textualist Approach
Unlike the legislative history approach, the textualist approach does not assert
that a "further transmission" occurs just because a broadcast is received on a
945 (1982).
148. The Gap Stores, 516 F. Supp. at 925.
149. See Claire's, 949 F.2d at 1495 (7th Cir. 1991) (court found that a further transmission via
speaker wire to other areas contrary to the legislative history, because "receiving apparatus" encom-
passes all the components of the stereo system).
150. 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
151. Id. at 1038.
152. Id. (noting that, although the performance was not optimal due to poor speaker quality, the
songs were still recognizable and audible to the public and were further transmissions).
153. See also Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (W.D.
Tex. 1988) (finding that a "further transmission" had taken place, not only because the broadcasts
were received in a room separate from the speakers, but because the transmissions were sent viaforry
feet of wiring) (emphasis added); U.S. Songs, Inc. v. Downside Lenox, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D.
Ga. 1991) ("further transmission" defined and applied in the same manner as Hickory Grove).
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radio receiver and relayed over speaker wire to a set of speakers in another
room. For example, the court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques,
Inc.54 examined the use of speaker wire, the length of the speaker wire and
the location of the speakers, and it found that no "further transmission" had
occurred.155 The receivers were kept in storage closets inaccessible to the pub-
lic, and they were connected via concealed wiring to two speakers located in the
public selling areas of the stores. 156 The court first noted that a "further trans-
mission" accomplished by mere transmission over speaker wires read the entire
factor out of the statute, because "every radio requires wiring ... to reach the
speakers which make the sound. To describe this as a further transmission means
that every sound system utilizes a further transmission."' 57
The court similarly held that the length of the speaker wires and the location
of the speakers away from the receiver were not determinative of whether a
"further transmission" had occurred."8 The court reasoned that any length of
wire would not alter the transmission itself, because it was the same transmission
received by the radio receiver and simultaneously played on the speakers.'59
Yet, the court also noted that if an establishment had used extensive lengths of
speaker wire, it likely would have utilized other components that would have
made the entire system commercial rather than private in nature."6 The court
also reasoned that the fact that the receiver and its speakers were located in
different places or rooms also did not alter the transmission itself, because the
manner in which speaker wire is routed is basically irrelevant to whether there
has been a "further transmission."' 6' According to the court, a system that
would have otherwise been exempt for utilizing a home-type system would no
longer be, merely because of the physical configuration of the components. 162
The court found this to be an insignificant distinction. 63
Thus, the court, by following a textualist approach, appeared to emphasize
aspects more important to the evaluation of a "further transmission to the public"
-- the communication itself rather than the components that carry it there. The
court felt that a "further transmission" must mean something more "substantial,
such as a re-broadcast of a transmission or the use of cable to service multiple
154. 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. I11. 1990), aftrd, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1942 (1992).
155. Claire's 754 F. Supp. at 1332.
156. Id. at 1326.
157. Id. at 1331. Had that been the case, no store could be found exempt from liability; and the
Aiken outer limit, allowing small commercial establishments to bring in standard radio equipment for
their customers enjoyment, would be thwarted.
158. Id. at 1332.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. The court did note, however, that if a receiver feeds a large number of speakers in differ-
ent rooms the exemption may not apply. Yet, the court felt such a determination was more relevant
to the home-type apparatus factor. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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receivers."'' Thus, it is more important that the communication be received
beyond the place from which it was sent, because this indicates that a secondary
transmission may have taken place. How the transmission travels from the
receiver to the speakers is irrelevant, since the broadcast received by the radio
receiver is the same primary transmission simultaneously emerging from the
speakers. Moreover, a "primary transmission" to the receiver would be inaudible
without the speakers; the sound emerging from the speakers is merely a
conversion of a radio wave into an audible sound wave.
The court in Edison Brothers Stores, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc.65 also
held that no "further transmission" had occurred in the establishments at issue.
As in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., the court doubted the
validity of examining the distance of the speakers from the receiver; yet, it
reasoned that the store policy of placing the speakers at a maximum distance of
fifteen feet from the receiver would not exceed the range of any "modest home-
style set up."' Instead, the court stated that a "homestyle operator may not re-
broadcast or secondarily broadcast a radio transmission to the public without
liability."' 67 The rebroadcast would occur when an operator tapes a radio bro-
adcast and plays it later with or without editing." This could not occur in the
establishments involved, because tape players and compact disc players were
prohibited under the store policy; only radio broadcasts could be utilized.69
Thus, if a broadcast could not be taped, it could not be secondarily transmitted at
a later time.
Although the court did not examine the length of the speaker wires or the
transmissions over those wires, the method used appears to be a logical way to
define what is meant by a "further transmission." By sending the original broad-
cast to the public a second time, the court can clearly deny exemption on a
predictable basis, because it will always entail something other than the original
broadcast received by the radio receiver and simultaneously made audible by the
stereo speakers.
In sum, the textualist approach, which looks to the transmission itself rather
than the components that carry it there, appears much easier to apply to a
particular set of circumstances. Moreover, the results reached by the legislative
history courts are unpredictable, since no boundaries have been drawn with
regard to the appropriate distance of the speakers from the receiver or the allow-
able length of wiring which may be utilized. By realizing that the transmission
164. Id. See also Claire's, 949 F.2d at 1495 (appellate court agreed with district court's conclu-
sions and stated that to "further transmit" a performance "must entail the use of some device or pro-
cess that expands the normal limits of the receiver's capabilities.").
165. 760 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aJ'd, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1995 (1992).
166. Edison Brothers Stores, 760 F. Supp. at 771.
167. Id.
168. Id. Moreover, the fact that the court believed that Edison Brothers was trying to simulate the
Aiken set up probably led to exemption as well.
169. Id. at 770.
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received by the receiver is the same transmission caried to the speakers, it
becomes obvious that a further transmission means something more substantial,
such as a rebroadcast of a radio program to the public. 70
IV. TEXTUALISM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OR BOTH?
The courts remain split as to which method of statutory interpretation is
superior in the § 110(5) analysis. Nevertheless, the legislative history approach is
much too broad to ensure predictable results. The factors listed in the legislative
history can be defined in a variety of ways by the courts, and the courts'
analyses appear to depend on what they deem appropriate under the
circumstances. This leaves courts with extensive discretionary power, which, in
order to obtain predictable results, needs to be curbed.
This is by no means a plea for a bright line rule. The courts' discretion needs
to be curbed, not eliminated, or the ensuing consequences will be detrimental.
Bright line rules, because they allow little discretion, "[s]ometimes fail to take
account of... competing values... [or fail] to attempt to find an accommoda-
tion that serves conflicting... interests as well as possible, and at the lowest
possible detriment to each.''. Thus, when attempting to balance a copyright
owner's rights against the public's need to utilize the copyrighted work, one
interest will be slighted, which will lead to unjust results. Moreover, Congress
could have constitutionally drawn such a bright line rule but instead left it to the
courts to adjudicate.'72
Notwithstanding this grant of discretion, the courts must adjudicate within the
area mandated by Congress. 73 They can accomplish this by adhering to a
textualist approach; and the approach taken in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's
Boutiques, Inc.74 may be the most beneficial beginning, although not an un-
equivocal answer, to resolving some of the arbitrariness resulting from the ad
hoc legislative history approach under §110(5). The Claire's analysis basically
requires a court to first look to the plain meaning of the statute; and, if it is not
ambiguous, to stop searching for other methods of interpretation. 75 However,
if the statute's plain meaning is not adequate for a thorough analysis, the court
should then turn to the legislative history behind the statute to help interpret the
170. Claire's, 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. I11. 1990). But see International Korwin Corp. v. Kowal-
czyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. I11. 1987) ("further transmission" occurred when performance origi-
nating in defendant's private office was sent to separate public areas of the establishment).
171. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l., 740 F. Supp. 37, 73 (D. Mass. 1990). In an
action brought for infringement of copyright for a computer spreadsheet program, defendant's argued
that a bright line rule should be established with regard to the idea-expression dichotomy. The court
refused to accept the defendant's position on the issue and stated, "Without a congressional mandate,
it would be an abuse of authority for this court, in deciding this case, to use a bright-line test of
copyrightability that makes the literal-nonliteral distinction [of the elements of the computer program]
decisive. Instead, the court must adjudicate within the area of protection mandated by Congress." Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Claire's, 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
175. Id. at 1333.
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meaning of the statute but not to add additional elements or requirements to the
statute. '76
Such an approach forces the courts to focus on what the statute says it
requires prior to considering the legislative history to support the determina-
tions." A narrow focus will restrict, but not eliminate, the broad discretion
allotted to courts applying the legislative history approach. This is partially
accomplished by refusing to deal with requirements not provided for in the
statute, which limits the areas in which the court can create diverse definitions
for various circumstances and reach results on the basis of whim.
A. Single Receiving Apparatus of a Kind Commonly Found in a Private Home
The courts' most complex task is determining whether a "single receiving
apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes" is or is not being utilized
by a public establishment. 78 The mere fact that the legislative history courts
cannot make up their minds as to which factors, e.g., size, physical arrangement,
noise levels, and alteration/augmentation, 7 9 are most significant to the analysis,
and what meanings are appropriate to extract from these factors, leads to the
conclusion that the courts should not be allowed excessive discretion to define
the parameters of these requirements.
Fortunately, since Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews,'80 the courts have
moved away from a "size" analysis and have examined the key factors involved:
the components themselves and their arrangement in the stores. The textualist
courts have picked up on this trend, and applying the narrowly defined list of
factors provided in Claire's, e.g., number of speakers accommodated, number of
speakers used, manner of speaker installation, distance of speakers from
receiver,' 8' may be the most beneficial course of action, since they focus on
the components of the system and their arrangement in the establishment. The
Claire's court compiled this list of factors by determining what other courts
deemed necessary to the analysis, t82 even though these courts never clarified
176. Id.
177. But see, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 18. at 38 ("The result [of looking only to the legislative
history if the statutory language is unclear] is that the Court ends up limiting the application of stat-
ues in instances where Congress intended they should apply, constricting rather than implementing
legislative choices.").
178. 17 U.S.C. §110(5) (1988).
179. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976).
180. Hickory Grove, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
181. Claire's, 754 F. Supp. 1324.
182. Id. at 1329. See also supra Section III(A)(2) and accompanying text. The cases relied on by
the Claire's court include: Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Pa. 1985);
Lamminations Music v. P&X Markets, Inc., No. C 84 6840 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Springsteen v. Plaza
Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Merrill v. County Stores, Inc., 669 F. Supp.
1164 (D. N.H. 1987); International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. I11. 1987);
Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Gnossos
Music v. DiPompo, No. 89-0051 P, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15988 at *1 (D. Me. 1989); Broadcast
Music. Inc. v. Jeep Sales & Service Co., 747 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Va. 1990); Crabshaw Music v. K-
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the weight or relationship of these factors. 83 However, the court found no one
factor to be determinative to their conclusion; and, instead, employed a balancing
test to reach the conclusion that a majority of the factors weighed in the
proprietor's favor.
184
Moreover, these factors emerge easily from the statutory language, since the
textualist approach relies on what a "reasonable person" would think the statute
entails. " 5 A reasonable person would likely find the Claire's factors pertinent
to whether a system belongs in a private home versus a commercial
establishment. The factors are also narrowly defined; thus, they are difficult to
expand upon, unlike the legislative history factors, which allow a variety of
definitions to evolve from the factors provided. This, in turn, would limit the
courts' discretionary powers.
Yet, a problem still exists with regard to drawing the appropriate boundary
lines for these narrowly tailored factors. Should the maximum distance between
the receiver and speakers be fifteen feet as in Edison Brothers Stores, Inc. v.
Broadcast Music, Inc.? Should the proprietor be held liable for utilizing five
speakers instead of the four allowed in Aiken if the speakers are in close
proximity to the receiving set? Such questions have not been answered
definitively, if at all, by the textualist courts; thus, they remain major obstacles to
defining the parameters of the § 110(5) exemption.
It would also appear that attempting to approximate, as closely as possible,
the physical arrangement found in Aiken would serve the underlying purposes of
§110(5). Perhaps requiring a policy as simplistic as that found in Edison
Brothers should be implemented in any store wishing to be exempt from
liability. This could be accomplished by the use of several simple home-type
components, rather than the use of a single, more powerful system that might
border on a non-home style apparatus. Such a set-up would ensure that
proprietors wishing to avoid liability for exceeding the Aiken outer limit would
purchase the type of components utilized by private consumers and would install
them in a manner that will not thwart the spirit of the exemption. This, too,
would curb the courts' discretion.
Consequently, none of the textualist cases appeared extremely difficult to
decide, and it is questionable whether the answers would have come so easily in
a more complex case. Yet, if the Claire's factors or a store policy such as
Edison Brothers is implemented and the court fully discusses each factor, instead
of picking and choosing what it deems appropriate to emphasize or de-empha-
size, textualism appears the less arbitrary of the two available methods.
Bob's of El Paso, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749
F. Supp. 1031 (Mont. 1990).
183. Claire's, 754 F. Supp. at 1329.
184. Id. at 1331.
185. In the Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1343. 24
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B. Of Sufficient Size to Justify Licensing
Under a textualist approach, the background music service test would be
eliminated automatically, since the statute nowhere states that an establishment
should be examined to determine if it is "of sufficient size to justify
licensing."' 6 By eliminating this evaluation, the courts are able to escape
ascertaining whether Congress meant the physical or financial size of an estab-
lishment, or both.'8 7 The courts should have no qualms about discarding an
evaluation they are neither qualified nor required to make under §110(5).
C. Further Transmission to the Public
The fact that a majority of the legislative history courts have failed to even
note the existence of the "further transmission" requirement is indicative of their
failure to focus on the statutory language.' 8 Moreover, the courts that did
analyze this factor reached their results by relying on the equipment carrying the
transmission. Yet, this distinction is irrelevant for'determining whether or not a
primary or secondary transmission has taken place, since to further transmit
could not possibly mean the use of any device or process receiving the primary
transmission. It would be unjust to say that anyone receiving a transmission is
automatically further transmitting it to the public merely because the public is
within range to hear the initial broadcast.
Fortunately, textualist courts focus on the type of communication taking place
and evaluate whether the broadcast at issue is a primary or a secondary
transmission. Thus, once it is determined that an original broadcast is being
performed, there is no "further transmission." Thus, under this approach, a
transmission received by a radio receiver and simultaneously produced on the
speakers is the original transmission regardless of where the speakers are located
or how much wiring is used.
According to one commentator, a further transmission to the public
"[o]ccurs ... when the use of supplemental radio equipment extends the broad-
cast to a ... wider audience than the same radio broadcast would otherwise
enjoy."'89 For example, taping a broadcast and rebroadcasting it, via a cassette
player, at a later time would extend a transmission to a wider audience than
would otherwise be reached. The public is acquiring a second chance to hear
what they missed when the original broadcast was played to the public; thus, a
further transmission has occurred. Moreover, a tape player is supplemental radio
equipment, which is not vital to carrying the radio broadcast; thus, a further
transmission has occurred. Such a definition of "to further transmit" would
186. H.R. Rep. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976).
187. See supra note 117 (if necessary, a court may evaluate the physical size of the establishment
under the first statutory factor: A single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly found in private
homes). See also supra Section MII(B) and accompanying text.
188. 17 U.S.C. §1 10(5)(B) (1988). See supra note 146. See also Section II(C) and accompanying
text.
189. Maslow, supra note 49, at 1088 (emphasis added).
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eliminate the need to determine when a room becomes too far away to place a
receiver in or why placing a receiver in a storage closet or back room, inaccessi-
ble to the public, creates a further transmission if the speakers are in a publicly
accessible area. Speaker wire is not supplemental radio equipment. It is vital to
the broadcast, and the transmission has not been altered by the fact that a
receiver, speakers and speaker wire comprise the necessary technology to convert
an inaudible radio wave into a sound wave capable of being heard by the human
ear.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
No claim has been made here that a final, workable solution exists for this
complex issue. Nevertheless, the courts should rely on what Congress provided
in the statute itself rather than forcing itself to apply the legislative history, a
history that was not enacted into law."9 By doing so, the courts may disregard
the elements that Congress obviously did not feel were indispensable to the law
finally enacted and focus on the elements provided in the statute itself; criteria
that reasonable people assume are all they are required to abide by in their daily
lives.
190. Yet, courts must respect legislative policy/history when enforcing statutory mandates, because
they establish the limitations placed on the role of the judiciary. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 71. If the
courts fail to respect such intent, they thwart any meaningful separation of powers that exist between
the legislature and the courts. The court is not a co-author of the statute, it is merely an interpreter of
Congressional prerogatives. Greenberger, supra note 18, at 41.
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